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Abstract: Sustainability reporting and assurance have considerably increased in the last decades.
Among different sectors, ‘sensitive sectors’ attracted the attention of many academics. However,
most of research works were focused only on ‘environmentally-sensitive sectors’. Therefore, after the
loss of trust caused by the lack of transparency due to the crisis, ‘socially-sensitive sectors’ as
financial services sector needs to strengthen users’ confidence in the credibility of their reported
activities. The aim of this paper is to assess assurance practices worldwide in one of the main
‘socially-sensitive sectors’: the financial services sector. We study what factors are associated with
adoption of assurance and choice of assurance provider, and whether assurance statements differ
across providers. Our results reveal that, compared to the global context, companies operating in the
financial services sector are more likely to adopt assurance and to choose accountants as assurance
providers. Our findings show that adoption of assurance depends on company size. We also found
that companies using the financial services sector supplement are more prone to adopt assurance.
Our results also evidence that choice of assurance provider depends on the country and listing status
Finally, our research shows a great variability in assurance statements across providers.
Keywords: sustainability reporting; CSR reporting; assurance; financial services; socially-sensitive sectors
1. Introduction
Traditionally, the academic literature found significant sector-level differences in sustainability
reporting and assurance, based on its ‘sensitiveness’. In this way, researchers distinguish between
‘sensitive sectors’; that is, those with high social or environmental impact, and ‘non-sensitive sectors’,
without significant social or environmental impact (see, for example, [1–5]).
Among ‘sensitive sectors’, the major part of studies tackled aspects of so-called ‘environmentally-
sensitive sectors’ such as mineral extraction, oil and gas, energy, forestry, chemicals, construction
materials, and steel. In fact, since 1978, we found dozens of articles about ‘environmentally-sensitive
sectors’ (see, for example, [6–12]). Moreover, the pioneers issuing in the 1980s and early-90s
Environmental Reports belonged to the petrochemical sector. However, although there are several
studies about sustainability reporting in ‘socially-sensitive sectors’ (see, for example, [13–19]), to the
best of our knowledge, there is no evidence about research works that analyse the sustainability
assurance in this kind of sectors. In this regard, our study finds to shed light into a clear research gap
in the field, focusing on the financial services sector.
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Compared to other sectors, the financial services sector has significantly lower direct
environmental impact, which is used as an argument to exclude financial services companies in
many studies. However, there are valid arguments for their inclusion [13].
The financial crisis has brought about dramatic consequences for the economy and society, and the
financial sector has been accused of being responsible for it [17]. Previous studies have highlighted
how the financial sector had a degree of responsibility at the economic-financial crisis in regulatory
failure and over-optimistic policies terms [20]. Accordingly, the crisis brought with it vast social impact
costs, not only for the financial system, but also for taxpayers and recipients of welfare subsidies [18].
The critical situation experienced by financial companies in this situation has caused discredit in and
distrust of society. Consequently, sustainability is necessary to produce and maintain trust [19].
Companies in the financial services sector (including retail banking, commercial and corporate
banking, asset management and insurance companies [21]) play the role of financial intermediaries in
society pricing and valuing financial assets, monitoring borrowers, managing financial risks, organising
the payment system and covering for the financial consequences of situations that people try to avoid.
These companies strongly influence society by performing their activities [15,16].
The financial services sector is a ‘socially-sensitive sector’ because of its influence on financial
well-being and its large ‘social footprint’. Consequently, stakeholders are deeply interested in its
activities [4]. According to Day and Woodward [14], it is an interesting sector in the sustainability
reporting context because of its size and the role it plays in easing economic dealings for both companies
and individuals. Therefore, in line with Sierra et al. [5], it is considered a ‘sensitive sector’ with regards
to sustainability.
By means of sustainability reporting, companies reveal the social and environmental consequences
of their activities to stakeholders within society and to society at large [22]. It is understood as a way of
guaranteeing the legitimacy of organisations, an instrument to handle relationships with stakeholders,
or a system to create good impressions and/or to hide conflicts [23]. According to ACCA [24], it is the
main approach for many companies to show their corporate legitimacy to their stakeholders.
In view of accountability pressures and a greater transparency of corporate behaviour,
sustainability reporting has increased in response to environmental and social’s concerns, governance
issues and responsibility problems [25,26]. Among other factors, risk and reputation management,
external pressure, moral reasons, and support of better investor relations and corporate performance
have been determining factors of sustainability reporting [23].
The most used standard to prepare sustainability reports is the GRI Sustainability Reporting
Guidelines (Global Reporting Initiative—GRI). According to KPMG [27], 74% of the Global 250
companies (G250: the top 250 companies of the Fortune 500 Index) and 72% of the National
100 companies (N100: the top 100 companies in 45 countries where KPMG works) follow the
GRI guidelines.
Despite the increased of sustainability reporting, researchers have criticised a lack of accountability
and transparency [28–31]. This practice is topic to concerns with regards to the completeness and
credibility of the information [28,29]. In this sense, sustainability reports have been harshly criticised
for being poor in quality [32], mainly because they do not always provide complete data, which
in turn intensifies the problem with the assessment [33]. According to Owen et al. [28], companies
just disclose positive information to get corporate advantage and a better reputation, instead of
looking for accountability for stakeholders. On the word of Michelon et al. [34], companies that use
sustainability reporting do not provide a higher quality of information, which evidences a symbolic
use of these practices. Moreover, scepticism and mistrust toward companies often prevails among both
stakeholders and scholars [35]. This situation has created a need for credible reported information,
known as the so-called ‘credibility gap’.
As a result, some organisations submit their sustainability reports to an external assurance process
that is performed by independent experts. According to Adams and Evans [30], the credibility of the
information contained in these reports increases through voluntary assurance. Moroney et al. [36]
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affirmed that assurance is positively associated with the quality of reports. In accordance with
Simnet [26], providing external assurance on the content and structure of sustainability reports
enhances their importance, reliability, and comparability, and therefore, their global credibility.
Moreover, it generates confidence in stakeholders with regards to the quality of the provided
information and commitment to sustainability plans. So, companies that wish to enhance the
credibility of their reports and to build their corporate reputation are more likely to adopt assurance [4].
KPMG [27] highlighted that 63% of G250 companies and 42% of N100 firms use assurance as a way to
validate and to evaluate their sustainability reporting.
As stated by GRI [37], the outcome of the assurance process is an assurance report or statement
where form and content differs depending on the assurance provider, the assurance scope, and the
assurance standards. The assurance provider is an independent expert that is engaged to provide
assurance services. The main types of providers are accountants and non-accountants (including
engineering firms, and sustainability services firms). The scope relates to the extent of subject matter or
information included in a sustainability report and covered by the assurance process. The two
most commonly used international standards are the AA1000 Assurance Standard (AA1000AS)
(AccountAbility) and the International Standard of Assurance Engagements Other Than Audits
or Reviews of Historical Financial Information (ISAE 3000) (IAASB). AA1000AS provides the
requirements for conducting sustainability assurance [38], while ISAE 3000 provides the principles
and procedures for accounting firms to follow, when reviewing non-financial information [39,40].
Neither standard is conflicting nor a substitute, but both are complementary in terms of providing
complete and strong external assurance [41].
In this line, the purpose of this paper is to analyse assurance practices in the financial services
sector. First, we compare trends in this ‘socially-sensitive sector’ with the general trends. We analyse
what factors influence financial services companies to adopt assurance, and choose an assurance
provider. Moreover, we check whether assurance statements differ across providers. The paper
proceeds as follows. First, we present the theoretical approach and a literature review. In the following
section, we describe the sample and the methodology employed. Later, we expose our results. Finally,
we discuss the results of the study and present our conclusions.
2. Literature Review and Development of Research Questions
2.1. Theoretical Approach
The research of sustainability practices has produced a wide range of literature that engages
different theoretical approaches [3]. According to Smith et al. [42], a framework for investigating
sustainability assurance should use a systems-oriented theory to position this practice into a social
context. Systems-oriented theories offer a powerful lens [22] as it allows the introduction of
broader societal influences in analysing the way that companies operate, and the information that
they reveal [43]. The most widely used systems-oriented theories are institutional, legitimacy,
and stakeholder theories [44,45].
Institutional theory tries to explain how institutions adopt similar practices or structures to
conform to external expectations and gain legitimacy and support [46,47]. Institutional change
takes place along three mechanisms: mimetic, coercive, and normative isomorphism. These three
mechanisms push companies to be more transparent, and socially and environmentally responsible [48].
Mimetic isomorphism describes the process by which organisations emulate the structures
and procedures adopted by other organisations [47]. In this regard, Martínez-Ferrero and
García-Sánchez [49] showed that the adoption of assurance responds to mimetic pressures, since
the sector where companies perform their activities act as an influential factor, and it is assumed that
competition may cause companies of one sector to adopt the strategies and practices of those that are
perceived as more successful [48,49]. Moreover, sensitivity to external demands and high political
costs would led companies to emulate sector norms as a legitimation strategy [48]. Similarly, Amran
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and Haniffa [48] suggested that sustainability practices could be explained by mimetic isomorphism,
given that company size act as an influential factor, and large companies could provide leadership
in sustainability practices, or mimic their competitors, since their activities are relevant to different
stakeholders. Coercive isomorphism describes how external factors (e.g., government policy, regulation
or commercial pressures) exert power on organisations to adopt specific internal structures and
procedures [47]. In this respect, Martínez-Ferrero and García-Sánchez [49] showed that adoption of
assurance responds to coercive pressures, since the legal systems act as an influential factor. Specifically,
civil law countries are more likely to adopt assurance [49], since they are more oriented toward
stakeholders [50] and, society understand a wide range of stakeholders as possessing a legitimate
interest in corporate activities [51]. Normative isomorphism is the process by which organisations
adopt the structures and procedures advanced by dominant professions, professional bodies, and/or
consultants [47]. Accordingly, Martínez-Ferrero and García-Sánchez [49] showed that the adoption
of assurance is positively associated with normative pressures based on the cultural development of
countries where companies operate. That is, that companies show a greater likelihood of assuring
sustainability reports and have a greater sustainability commitment in societies more culturally
developed. According to Scott [52,53], cultural systems could be considered as normative forces,
since they introduce a prescriptive, evaluative and obligatory dimension to social life. In this respect,
García-Sánchez et al. [51] argued that the cultural affinity of sustainability determines stakeholders’
expectations for companies, generating a propensity in firms to adopt sustainable behaviour and
improve their transparency to obtain social legitimacy. On the other hand, this kind of isomorphism is
consistent with the ‘standardisation’ of assurance [54] through, for instance, the increase of adoption
of standards [42], like the ISAE 3000 and the AA1000AS.
The idea of legitimacy theory is that businesses are bound by a social contract in which the
companies agree to perform some socially desired actions in return for approval of their goals and
other rewards, and this ultimately guarantees their survival [46]. That is, companies will behave
in such a way that society will recognise them as socially responsible [55]. The assurance process
generally has an important role in establishing legitimacy [56], and it is considered to be a necessary
tool for satisfying the social demands that ensure the survival of the firm [49]. In line with this theory,
it is assumed that companies with high social and/or environmental impacts are more visible to the
public, and consequently they have a greater need to demonstrate that they are socially responsible
and to legitimise their role in society [46]. Equally, large companies have a higher political visibility,
so they are expected to engage more heavily in legitimating behaviour [57]. In the same way, publicly
listed companies can be more actively engaged in sustainability practices in order to obey to certain
regulations, adopt good practice by competitors, and/or to accomplish with stakeholder pressure [57].
The stakeholder theory recognises companies as a part of a wider social system in which their
commercial activities affect, and are affected by, other stakeholders within society [46,58]. Managers
have to recognize the changes in the environment among internal and external stakeholders [58]. It is
presumed that a large numbers of stakeholders directly increase the need for companies to explain
their business behaviour [44]. Accordingly, it is expected that stakeholder pressure influences the
decision to adopt assurance [45,49] and the selection of assurance provider [45], since firms operating
in different sectors should focus on certain stakeholders more than they should focus on others [59]
and respond to sector-specific stakeholder pressure [60].
According to [1] and Fernández-Feijóo et al. 2015 [45], the legitimacy theory can be used to explain
differences related to company characteristics. However, the reasons for differences across countries
are more complex [1], and could be explained by institutional theory [45]. Thus, in line with Reverte [3],
Hahn and Kühnen 2013 [44], Fernández-Feijóo et al. 2015 [45], we used these three different theories to
explain differences in sustainability assurance practices in the financial services sector.
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2.2. Sustainability Assurance
Empirical research on sustainability assurance has quickly increased with regard to enhanced
stakeholder information awareness [61]. Hummel et al. [62] established three primary areas of interest.
The first area comprises studies which focus on factors, mostly at the sector-, country-, and
company-level, which influence the decision to adopt assurance [62]. With regard to the sector, Zorio
et al. [63] and Castelo Branco et al. [64] pointed it out as a determinant factor for adopting assurance.
Simnett et al. [4] found that firms that engage in more highly visible industrial activity and those with
a larger ‘social footprint’, such as the financial sector, were more likely to assure their sustainability
reports. Cho et al. [65] evidenced that those from the financial sector or ‘environmentally-sensitive
sectors’ were more likely to seek external assurance. Fernández-Feijoó-Souto et al. [45] showed that
the probability of adopting assurance was higher for companies belonging to sectors with greater
visibility, such as financial services. Sierra et al. [5] revealed that companies from ‘sensitive sectors’
(such as oil and energy, or financial services) were more likely to adopt assurance. Martínez-Ferrero
and García-Sánchez [49] highlighted that companies operating in sectors greatly concerned about
sustainability were more likely to adopt assurance. Regarding country, Simnet et al. [4] and Kolk and
Perego [25] found that companies located in stakeholder-oriented countries were more likely to assure
their sustainability reports than companies located in shareholder-oriented countries. On the other
hand, Fernández-Feijoó-Souto et al. [45] did not find that the legal system of a country significantly
affected the decision to adopt assurance. However, they found that companies in the EU were more
likely to adopt assurance than companies in non-EU countries. Factors considered at the company-level
are listing status and company size. Focusing on the listing status, Zorio et al. [63] pointed out
that listed companies were more likely to adopt assurance. In contrast, Castelo Branco et al. [64]
indicated that listed companies were less likely to assure their sustainability reports. In relation to the
company size, several authors found that larger companies were more likely to adopt assurance (see,
for example, [4,5,45,63,64,66]). On the contrary, Cho et al. [65] did not find that size was associated with
adoption of assurance. In addition to these factors, we considered the use of the sector supplement.
GRI provides Sector Supplements [67,68] or Sector Disclosures [69] that cover the needs of specific
sectors complementing guidelines with interpretations and guidance, and sector-specific performance
indicators. Sector supplements or disclosures are available for the following sectors: airport operators,
construction, and real estate, electric utilities, event organisers, financial services, food processing,
media, mining, and metals, NGO, oil and gas. Thus, companies using the supplement disclose more
information about their sustainability performance, so we expect that they are more prone to adopt
assurance. Based on the literature, we formulated the following research questions:
RQ1: Is the adoption of assurance associated with the sector where a company performs its
activity, and especially with the financial services sector?
RQ2: Focusing on the financial services sector, is the adoption of assurance associated with
the country where a company is located, the listing status, company size and the use of the
sector supplement?
Similar to the adoption of assurance, other researchers analysed factors for the choice of assurance
providers (generally, classified in accounting and non-accounting providers). At the sector-level,
Zorio et al. [63] highlighted it as a determinant of choice of assurance provider. Fernández-Feijoó-Souto
et al. [45] found that the likelihood of choosing big accounting providers was higher for companies
from more visible sectors. Sierra et al. [66] found that sectors, such as oil and energy, basic
materials or financial services, significantly tended to choose accounting firms as assurance providers.
At country-level, Simnet et al. [4] found that companies from stakeholder-oriented countries were
more likely to choose large accounting firms as assurance providers. However, Kolk and Perego [25]
revealed that the likelihood of choosing large accounting firms increased for companies located in
shareholder-oriented countries. On the other hand, Fernández-Feijóo-Souto et al. [45] did not find
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that the choice of assuror was significantly associated with the legal system of a country. At the
company-level, Simnet et al. [4], Kolk and Perego [25], and Fernández-Feijoó-Souto et al. [45]
highlighted that large companies were more likely to choose accounting providers. Conversely,
Zorio et al. [63] found no association between company size and choice of assuror. However,
they evidenced that to be listed was clearly significant for choosing an assurance provider. In addition
to these factors, we also considered the use of the sector supplement. Accordingly, we formulated the
next research questions:
RQ3: Is choice of assurance provider associated with the sector where a company performs
its activity, and especially with the financial services sector?
RQ4: Focusing on the financial services sector, is the choice of assurance provider associated
with the country where a company is located, listing status, company size, and the use of the
sector supplement?
The second and third areas of research in sustainability assurance include studies that
analyse assurance statements, and the associations between their content and assurance providers,
respectively [62]. In this way, O’Dwyer and Owen [70] found that all statements made reference to the
assurance scope, a small percentage indicated the assurance standard, and less than half specified the
level of assurance. They noted that non-accountants were more likely to mention standards, and this
led the use of the AA1000AS. On the other hand, accountants were more likely to indicate the level
of assurance and applied a more conservative, cautious, and limited approach to provide low levels,
while non-accountants applied a more evaluative approach and provided higher levels. Hasan et al. [71]
evidenced that many of the accounting firms applied a limited/moderate level of assurance rather than
a reasonable/high level. Deegan et al. [72,73] found considerable variability in presentation formats
and contents across assurance providers; for example, they pointed out that accounting providers were
more likely to mention assurance standards. Mock et al. [74,75] revealed that big accounting firms
were more likely to specify the standard used, employ international standards (such as the ISAE 3000),
and provide lower levels of assurance. Manetti and Becatti [76] evidenced that the most widely used
standard was the ISAE 3000, followed by a combination of the ISAE 3000 and the AA1000AS, and most
assurors applied a limited/moderate level of assurance. Manetti and Toccafondi [77] found that almost
all statements specified the standards used. The most frequent adoption was a combination of two
standards, followed by the use of the ISAE 3000, the AA1000AS, and other national or international
standards. Only accountants used ISAE 3000 and were more likely to combine standards (mainly the
combination of ISAE 3000 and AA1000AS), while consultants showed a preference for AA1000AS
or other national or international standards. Their results indicated that most providers mentioned
the level of assurance, and most applied a limited/moderate level. Perego and Kolk [78] pointed
out that most of assurance providers combined the AA1000AS, the ISAE 3000 and GRI guidelines.
They revealed that accountants employed mainly the ISAE 3000, while non-accountants tended to use
the AA1000AS. Ferreira et al. [79] studied assurance among Portuguese companies and revealed that
the dominant standard used was ISAE 3000. Following the literature, our research question stated
as follows:
RQ5: Is the type of assurance provider associated with the content of assurance statements?
Despite the large number of research works about sustainability assurance, we did not
find previous studies that paid attention to the financial services sector. Only a small number
of authors analysed assurance in a particular ‘environmentally-sensitive sector’. Specifically,
Bollas-Araya et al. [12] studied assurance practices in the agri-food sector, and factors associated
with adoption of assurance and choice of assuror. They found that, despite its environmental
sensitivity, agri-food companies were less likely to assure their reports than companies from other
sectors. Their results revealed a positive association between the listing status and the adoption
of assurance, and between the company size and the choice of assuror. Focusing on large mining
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companies, Fonseca [11] evaluated the content of their assurance statements and showed that all of
them specified the assurance scope, most made reference to standards employed (mainly, the ISAE
3000), and half of them mentioned the level of assurance (mostly, a reasonable level or a combination
of both levels). In this way, our study focused on the financial services sector, not only because of
its special link to sustainability and its high social impact, but also because we consider that it is an
interesting research gap. Our study explores the differences in sustainability assurance between this
‘socially-sensitive sector’ and the general behaviour. We analyse what factors are associated with
adoption of assurance and choice of assurance provider, and whether assurance statements differ
according to the type of provider.
3. Research Design
3.1. Data Collection and Sample Description
In order to investigate sustainability assurance in the financial services sector, we had recourse to
the GRI’s Sustainability Disclosure Database. We looked for companies worldwide that disclosed a
sustainability report between 2012 and 2015, and we selected those companies whose reports followed
guidelines G3, G3.1, or G4, excluding ‘no-GRI’ and ‘GRI-referenced’ reports. Afterwards, we checked
whether sustainability reports were submitted to an assurance process.
As shown in Table 1, the first sample is composed of 12,225 sustainability reports. The data
indicate that the highest percentage of reports comes from the financial services sector (representing
13.3% of total), followed by the energy (7.45%), food and beverage products (5.5%), energy utilities
(4.8%), and mining (4.3%) sectors. The second sample is composed of 5128 assurance statements.
In this case, the highest percentage of statements also comes from financial services companies (15.3%),
followed by energetic companies (9.1%).
Table 1. Sample description.
Sample 1: Sustainability Reports Sample 2: Assurance Statements
Sector n % n %
Agriculture 156 1.3 35 0.7
Automotive 283 2.3 110 2.1
Aviation 234 1.9 109 2.1
Chemicals 436 3.6 178 3.5
Commercial Services 274 2.2 108 2.1
Computers 131 1.1 58 1.1
Conglomerates 300 2.5 152 3.0
Construction 377 3.1 167 3.3
Construction Materials 299 2.4 140 2.7
Consumer Durables 111 0.9 44 0.9
Energy 910 7.4 468 9.1
Energy Utilities 584 4.8 293 5.7
Equipment 213 1.7 62 1.2
Financial Services 1629 13.3 785 15.3
Food and Beverage Products 672 5.5 250 4.9
Forest and Paper Products 189 1.5 87 1.7
Healthcare Products 255 2.1 97 1.9
Healthcare Services 191 1.6 59 1.2
Household and Personal Products 139 1.1 58 1.1
Logistics 282 2.3 109 2.1
Media 135 1.1 44 0.9
Metals Products 257 2.1 114 2.2
Mining 529 4.3 244 4.8
Non-Profit/Services 303 2.5 81 1.6
Other 966 7.9 317 6.2
Public Agency 207 1.7 73 1.4
Railroad 71 0.6 43 0.8
Real Estate 380 3.1 149 2.9
Retailers 235 1.9 72 1.4
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Table 1. Cont.
Sample 1: Sustainability Reports Sample 2: Assurance Statements
Technology Hardware 350 2.9 140 2.7
Telecommunications 441 3.6 236 4.6
Textiles and Apparel 141 1.2 42 0.8
Tobacco 24 0.2 11 0.2
Tourism/Leisure 185 1.5 65 1.3
Toys 4 0.0 1 0.0
Universities 82 0.7 13 0.3
Waste Management 113 0.9 53 1.0
Water Utilities 137 1.1 61 1.2
Total 12,225 100.0 5128 100.0
3.2. Methodology
As mentioned before, the aim of this paper was to characterise sustainability assurance in the
financial services sector. We tried to determine factors associated with the decision to adopt assurance,
and we chose an assurance provider in the financial services sector, and we analysed differences of
assurance statements across assurance providers. In this line, and based on the previous literature,
we defined the next variables:
• ASSURANCE indicates whether a sustainability report is assured. Thus, the variable takes a value
of ‘0’ if the report is not assured, and ‘1’ if it is assured.
• PROVIDER identifies the type of firm that provides assurance. Thus, the variable takes a value of
‘0’ if the assurance provider is a non-accountant (including engineering firms and sustainability
services firms), and ‘1’ if it is an accountant.
• SECTOR refers to the sector where a company performs its activity. According to the number of
sectors included in the GRI Database, this variable takes the values from ‘0’ to ‘38’.
• COUNTRY. In view of the diversity, we classified countries according to their legal system.
As stated by Ball et al. [50], companies domiciled in common law countries follow a more
shareholder-oriented corporate governance model, while companies domiciled in civil law
countries follow a more stakeholder-oriented model. Accordingly, this variable takes the value
of ‘0’ if the company is located in a common law country (shareholder-oriented), a value of ‘1’
if it is located in a civil law country (stakeholder-oriented), and a value of ‘2’ otherwise (i.e.,
if the company is located in a country where the legal system is based on the religious law,
the customary law, or a mixed system).
• SIZE follows the EU definitions of organisation size. In this way, the variable takes a value of ‘0’ if
the company is a Small and Medium Enterprise (SME—fewer than 250 employees, with a turnover
below 50 million € or with assets below 43 million €), a value of ‘1’ if it is a large enterprise (more
than 250 employees and more than 50 million € in turnover or 43 million € in assets), and a value
of ‘2’ if it is a Multinational Enterprise (MNE—large and multinational).
• LISTING STATUS indicates whether a company is listed in a stock exchange. So, the variable
takes a value of ‘0’ if the company is unlisted, and ‘1’ if it is listed.
• SECTOR SUPPLEMENT indicates whether a company use the financial services sector supplement
to prepare its sustainability report. Accordingly, this variable takes a value of ‘0’ if the company
does not use the supplement, and ‘1’ if it does.
• STANDARD represents the application of assurance standards. It takes a value of ‘0’ when no
standard is used or mentioned, ‘1’ when the AA1000AS is applied, ‘2’ when the ISAE 3000 is
applied, and ‘3’ when two standards are combined.
• SCOPE defines the information that the assurance process covers [37]. It takes a value of ‘0’ when
the assurance statement does not specify the scope, ‘1’ when the assurance process covers specified
sections or greenhouse gas only, and ‘2’ when the process covers the entire sustainability report.
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• LEVEL indicates the extent and depth of the work the assurance provider undertakes,
and therefore the degree of confidence report users should be able to have in the assured report [37].
It takes a value of ‘0’ when the assurance statement does not specify the level, ‘1’ when the level
is limited/moderate, ‘2’ when it is reasonable/high, and ‘3’ when there is a combination of
both levels.
In order to determine whether adoption of assurance and choice of assurance provider were
associated with a sector where the company operates, and especially with the financial services
sector, we employed a cross-tabulation analysis and the Pearson Chi-square test. With the aim
of studying whether the factors of country, company size, listing status, and the use of the sector
supplement influenced the adoption of assurance and choice of the assurance provider, we first
applied a cross-tabulation analysis and the Pearson Chi-square test. Moreover, we formulated the next
regression logistic models.
ASSURANCE = F (COUNTRY, SIZE, LISTING STATUS, SECTOR SUPPLEMENT)
PROVIDER = F (COUNTRY, SIZE, LISTING STATUS, SECTOR SUPPLEMENT)
Finally, we used again a cross-tabulation analysis and the Pearson Chi-square tests to check
whether assurance standards, scope and level of assurance were significantly associated with the
assurance provider.
4. Results
Regarding the adoption of assurance at sector-level (Table 2), we found that 48.2% of reports
published by financial services companies underwent external assurance in comparison to 41.9% on
a global scale. The railroad sector achieves the highest proportion of assurance statements (60.6%),
followed by the telecommunication (53.5%), energy (51.4%), conglomerates (50.7%), and energy utilities
(50.2%) sectors. The other sectors do not overcome 50% of assurance statements per sustainability
reports. The Pearson Chi-square test shows a significant association between the sector and adoption of
assurance (p < 0.01). In this way, we could positively answer our first research question. The decision to
adopt assurance was associated with the sector where companies performed their activities. Specifically,
the financial services sector was over the general trend, being more likely to adopt assurance than
companies from other sectors. This result was consistent with previous empirical evidence that affirmed
that companies from sensitive sectors were more likely to adopt assurance [4,5,45,63–65] and can be
explained by the institutional theory taking into account the higher social and regulatory pressures.
Focusing on the financial services sector, the results of the bivariate analysis (Table 3) showed
that, according to the Pearson Chi-square test, there was no significant association between the
country and adoption of assurance (p > 0.10), but there is a significant association between the listing
status and the adoption of assurance (p < 0.01), with listed companies being more favourable to
assure their sustainability reports. Size does not present a significant association with the adoption
of assurance (p > 0.10). Finally, the use of the sector supplement was significantly associated with
adoption of assurance (p < 0.01), with companies using this supplement being more likely to assure
their sustainability reports.
Results of multivariate analysis (Table 4) showed that our logistic regression model was significant
(p < 0.001). The Nagelkerke R-square indicated that it explained 7.12% of variability, revealing a
moderate relationship between the dependent and independent variables. Nevertheless, the Hosmer
and Lemeshow test was not significant (p > 0.10), which meant that there was no statistical difference
between estimated values and real values, confirming the goodness of fit of our model. The model
correctly classified 59.91% of overall cases, presenting a specificity of 69.08% and a sensitivity of
50.06%. The area under the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve (0.6264 < 0.7) indicates
a discrimination that was close to acceptable. The intercept term was weakly significant (p < 0.10)
and negative, meaning that the probability of assuring sustainability reports of firms that are unlisted
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and located in shareholder-oriented countries which do not use sector supplement is 56% of the
probability not to assure. We found a significant association between adoption of assurance and size
(p < 0.05), with large companies and MNEs being less likely to assure their sustainability reports than
SMEs. This finding differs from the general behaviour, which reflects that the likelihood that adopting
assurance is higher for large companies [4,5,45,63,64,66]. We also found that adoption of assurance is
significantly associated with the use of the sector supplement (p < 0.05), with companies using the
financial services supplement more likely to adopt assurance. Opposite to Simnett et al. [4] and Kolk
and Perego [25], but in line with Fernández-Feijoó-Souto et al. [45], we did not find that country have
a significant effect on assurance (p > 0.10), although the interaction between country (otherwise) and
supplement (yes) is weakly significant (p = 0.056 < 0.10) and negative, this means that the positive
effect of the use of supplement is smaller in countries where the legal system is based on the religious
law, the customary law, or a mixed system. We neither found that listing status influenced the decision
to assure sustainability reports (p > 0.10), which disagrees Zorio et al. [63] and Castelo-Branco et al. [64].
On the other hand, the interaction between the listed and MNE is weakly significant (p < 0.10) and
positive, which means that listed and multinational firms have more probability of assuring their
sustainability reports compared to the base category (unlisted and SME).
Table 2. Adoption of assurance at the sector level.
Assurance Not Assured Assured Total Chi-Square
Sector n % n % n % Value p-Value
Agriculture 121 77.6 35 22.4 156 100.0
312.897 0.000 *
Automotive 173 61.1 110 38.9 283 100.0
Aviation 125 53.4 109 46.6 234 100.0
Chemicals 258 59.2 178 40.8 436 100.0
Commercial Services 166 60.6 108 39.4 274 100.0
Computers 73 55.7 58 44.3 131 100.0
Conglomerates 148 49.3 152 50.7 300 100.0
Construction 210 55.7 167 44.3 377 100.0
Construction Materials 159 53.2 140 46.8 299 100.0
Consumer Durables 67 60.4 44 39.6 111 100.0
Energy 442 48.6 468 51.4 910 100.0
Energy Utilities 291 49.8 293 50.2 584 100.0
Equipment 151 70.9 62 29.1 213 100.0
Financial services 844 51.8 785 48.2 1629 100.0
Food and Beverage Products 422 62.8 250 37.2 672 100.0
Forest and Paper Products 102 54.0 87 46.0 189 100.0
Healthcare Products 158 62.0 97 38.0 255 100.0
Healthcare Services 132 69.1 59 30.9 191 100.0
Household and Personal Products 81 58.3 58 41.7 139 100.0
Logistics 173 61.3 109 38.7 282 100.0
Media 91 67.4 44 32.6 135 100.0
Metals Products 143 55.6 114 44.4 257 100.0
Mining 285 53.9 244 46.1 529 100.0
Non-Profit/Services 222 73.3 81 26.7 303 100.0
Other 649 67.2 317 32.8 966 100.0
Public Agency 134 64.7 73 35.3 207 100.0
Railroad 28 39.4 43 60.6 71 100.0
Real Estate 231 60.8 149 39.2 380 100.0
Retailers 163 69.4 72 30.6 235 100.0
Technology Hardware 210 60.0 140 40.0 350 100.0
Telecommunications 205 46.5 236 53.5 441 100.0
Textiles and Apparel 99 70.2 42 29.8 141 100.0
Tobacco 13 54.2 11 45.8 24 100.0
Tourism/Leisure 120 64.9 65 35.1 185 100.0
Toys 3 75.0 1 25.0 4 100.0
Universities 69 84.1 13 15.9 82 100.0
Waste Management 60 53.1 53 46.9 113 100.0
Water Utilities 76 55.5 61 44.5 137 100.0
Total 7097 58.1 5128 41.9 12,225 100.0
* p < 0.01.
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Table 3. Bivariate analysis about adoption of assurance in the financial services sector.
Assurance Not Assured Assured Total Chi-Square
Country n % n % n % Value p-Value
Shareholder-oriented 128 53.3 112 45.7 240 100.0
0.927 0.629
Stakeholder-oriented 575 51.0 552 49.0 1127 100.0
Otherwise 141 53.8 121 46.2 262 100.0
Total 844 51.8 785 48.2 1629 100.0
Listing Status n % n % n % Value p-Value
Non-listed 358 60.0 239 40.0 597 100.0
25.105 0.000 *Listed 486 47.1 546 52.9 1032 100.0
Total 844 51.8 785 48.2 1629 100.0
Size n % n % n % Value p-Value
SME 56 45.9 66 54.1 122 100.0
2.088 0.352
Large 631 52.0 583 48.0 1214 100.0
MNE 157 53.6 136 46.4 293 100.0
Total 844 51.8 785 48.2 1629 100.0
Sector Supplement n % n % n % Value p-Value
Otherwise 311 64.3 173 35.7 484 100.0
42.717 0.000 *Financial services 533 46.6 612 53.4 1145 100.0
Total 844 51.8 785 48.2 1629 100.0
* p < 0.01.
Table 4. Multivariate analysis about adoption of assurance in the financial services sector.
B S.E. z Sig. Exp(B)
Constant −0.57357 0.33435 −1.715 0.086254 *** 0.56351011
Country (stakeholder) 0.11062 0.27965 0.396 0.692418 1.11697038
Country (otherwise) 0.34579 0.31800 1.087 0.276867 1.41310583
Listing status (listed) 0.3744 0.41416 0.904 0.365987 1.45411868
Size (large) −0.51496 0.24317 −2.118 0.034200 ** 0.5975245
Size (MNE) −1.27811 0.36499 −3.502 0.000462 * 0.27856329
Supplement (yes) 0.91816 0.30111 3.049 0.002294 * 2.50467754
Country (stakeholder) * Supplement (yes) −0.07536 0.33459 −0.225 0.821796 0.92740956
Country (otherwise) * Supplement (yes) −0.74161 0.38934 −1.905 0.056808 *** 0.47634638
Listing status (listed) * Size (large) 0.15258 0.43160 0.354 0.723703 1.16483565
Listing status (listed) * Size (MNE) 0.92457 0.52473 1.762 0.078070 *** 2.52078409
Chisq = 89.394 p-value = 7.0615 × 10−15 * < 0.001
Nagelkerke R-square = 0.0712288
Hosmer and Lemeshow: Chi-square = 0.85639; p = 0.9733
Area under the curve (ROC): 0.6264
Overall percentage = 59.91%
Specificity = 69.08%
Sensitivity = 50.06%
* p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.10.
In order to interpret better the results and to assess the importance of each variable, we performed
univariate logistic regressions and we calculated the decrease in residual deviance from the null model
(a model with only intercept). Table 5 shows that the variable supplement is the most important
in order to reduce residual deviance not explained by the model, the second one is listing status,
and the third one is size. These data are in line with the bivariate analysis, but in contrast to the
multivariate model (Table 4) where listing status result was no significant. The explanation for this is
that the listing status and size present significant interactions, thus the individual contribution to the
explained deviance is confounded. In order to assess the joint residual contribution of size and listing
status, we computed the model 6 (Assurance = α + β1 listing status + β2 size + β3 size * listing status),
and calculated the decrease in residual deviance from the null model, resulting in 38.4.
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Table 5. Residual deviance in univariate models (adoption of assurance).
Model Residual Deviance Decrease in Residual Deviance
Model 1: Assurance = α (null model) 2256.1
Model 2: Assurance = α + β1 supplement 2212.9 43.2
Model 3: Assurance = α + β1 listing status 2230.9 25.2
Model 4: Assurance = α + β1 size 2254 2.1
Model 5: Assurance = α + β1 country 2254.4 1.7
In summary, regarding our second research question, we can affirm that adoption of assurance
is positively associated with use of sector supplement, and negatively associated with size. We also
found a positive association between listed MNEs and assurance. Finally, sector supplement has a
smaller positive effect in countries where the legal system is based on the religious law, the customary
law, or a mixed system. Therefore, the bulk of the effects are explained by variables derived from
the legitimacy theory, but the sign of association of size is the contrary to the expected according to
legitimacy theory.
With reference to choice of assurance providers at sector-level (Table 6), the percentage of reports
assured by accountants reaches 71% in the financial services sector, compared to 60.7% on a global
scale. On the other hand, the percentage of reports assured by non-accountants reaches 29% in
the financial services sector, in comparison to 39.3% on a global scale. For a total of 38 sectors,
companies from 28 sectors prefer accountants to assure their sustainability reports, while companies
from the other 10 sectors opt by non-accountants as assurance providers. The Pearson Chi-square
test showed a significant association between sector and choice of assurance provider (p < 0.01).
In view of the results, we could answer our third research question by affirming that the choice of
assurance provider was associated with the sector where companies perform their activities. Similarly,
to Fernández-Feijoó-Souto et al. [45], Zorio et al. [63] and Sierra et al. [66], we found that firms
belonging to the financial services sector are more likely to choose accountants as assurance providers.
Focusing on the financial services sector, results of bivariate analysis (Table 7) show that, according
to the Pearson Chi-square test, country is significantly associated with choice of assurance provider (p
< 0.01), where stakeholder-oriented countries present the highest likelihood of choosing accountants.
There was a significant association between listing status and choice of assurance provider (p < 0.01).
Specifically, the probability of hiring accountants is greater for non-listed companies, comparing to
listed companies. Neither size nor the use of sector supplement present a significant association with
the choice of assurance provider (p > 0.10).
Results of multivariate analysis (Table 8) show that our logistic regression model is significant (p
< 0.001). The Nagelkerke R-square indicates that our model explains 14% of variability, revealing a
moderate relationship between the dependent and independent variables. Nevertheless, the Hosmer
and Lemeshow test is not significant (p > 0.10), which means that there is no statistical difference
between estimated values and real values, confirming the goodness of fit of our model. The model
correctly classifies 73.25% of overall cases, presenting a specificity of 9.65% and a sensitivity of 99.28%.
The area under the ROC curve (0.6255 < 0.7) indicated a discrimination close to acceptable. We found a
significant association between choice of assurance provider and country (p < 0.05), with companies
domiciled in stakeholder-oriented countries being more likely to choose accountants than companies
located in shareholder-oriented countries. This finding agrees with Simnett et al. [4], but goes against
Kolk and Perego [25]. In line with Zorio et al. [63], but unlike Bollas-Araya et al. [12], we also found that
choice of assurance provider was significantly associated with listing status (p < 0.01) with non-listed
companies more likely to hire accountants than listed companies. On the other hand, we did not
find an association with the use of the sector supplement. We did not found that size, as main factor,
influences the choice of assurance provider (p > 0.10), which differs with Simnett et al. [4], Kolk and
Perego [25], Fernández-Feijoó-Souto et al. [45], and Bollas-Araya et al. [12]. However, we found a
strongly significant (p < 0.01) and positive (6.04) interaction between large firms and listed firms; due
the positive interaction, the ‘effect size’ was lower when comparing the main effects, but it was still
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negative (β = −6.07 − 0.44 + 6.04 = −0.47); therefore, listed and large firms are less prone to choose
accountants as assurors, compared to the base category (unlisted firm and SME). We also found a
weakly significant (p < 0.10) and negative interaction between the stakeholder-oriented country and
MNE, meaning a final positive and strong effect (β = 2.97 + 16.66 − 2.45 = 16.17) compared to the base
category (shareholder-oriented country and SME).
Table 6. Choice of assurance provider at sector-level.
Assurance Non-Accountant Accountant Total Chi-Square
Sector n % n % n % Value p-Value
Agriculture 18 51.4 17 48.6 35 100.0
251.743 0.000 *
Automotive 49 44.5 61 55.5 110 100.0
Aviation 56 51.4 53 48.6 109 100.0
Chemicals 85 47.5 93 52.2 178 100.0
Commercial Services 47 43.5 61 56.5 108 100.0
Computers 32 55.2 26 44.8 58 100.0
Conglomerates 47 30.9 105 69.1 152 100.0
Construction 75 44.9 92 55.1 167 100.0
Construction Materials 53 37.9 87 62.1 140 100.0
Consumer Durables 26 59.1 18 40.9 44 100.0
Energy 154 32.9 314 67.1 468 100.0
Energy Utilities 86 29.4 207 70.6 293 100.0
Equipment 35 56.5 27 43.5 62 100.0
Financial services 228 29.0 557 71.0 785 100.0
Food and Beverage Products 95 38.0 155 62.0 250 100.0
Forest and Paper Products 34 39.1 53 60.9 87 100.0
Healthcare Products 47 48.5 50 51.5 97 100.0
Healthcare Services 42 71.2 17 28.8 59 100.0
Household and Personal Products 28 48.3 30 51.7 58 100.0
Logistics 22 20.2 87 79.8 109 100.0
Media 18 40.9 26 59.1 44 100.0
Metals Products 46 40.4 68 59.6 114 100.0
Mining 83 34.0 161 66.0 244 100.0
Non-Profit/Services 39 48.1 42 51.9 81 100.0
Other 133 42.0 184 58.0 317 100.0
Public Agency 52 71.2 21 28.8 73 100.0
Railroad 13 30.2 30 69.8 43 100.0
Real Estate 58 38.9 91 61.1 149 100.0
Retailers 25 34.7 47 65.3 72 100.0
Technology Hardware 97 69.3 43 30.7 140 100.0
Telecommunications 85 36.0 151 64.0 236 100.0
Textiles and Apparel 21 50.0 21 50.0 42 100.0
Tobacco 4 36.4 7 63.6 11 100.0
Tourism/Leisure 30 46.2 35 53.8 65 100.0
Toys 0 0.0 1 100.0 1 100.0
Universities 8 61.5 5 38.5 13 100.0
Waste Management 15 28.3 38 71.7 53 100.0
Water Utilities 30 49.2 31 50.8 61 100.0
Total 2016 39.3 3112 60.7 5128 100.0
* p < 0.01.
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Table 7. Bivariate analysis about choice of assurance provider in the financial services sector.
Provider Non-Accountant Accountant Total Chi-Square
Country Status n % n % n % Value p-Value
Shareholder-oriented 51 45.5 61 54.5 112 100.0
17.733 0.000 *
Stakeholder-oriented 142 25.7 410 74.3 552 100.0
Otherwise 35 28.9 86 71.1 121 100.0
Total 228 29.0 557 71.0 785 100.0
Listing Status n % n % n % Value p-Value
Non-listed 53 22.2 186 77.8 239 100.0
7.867 0.005 *Listed 175 32.1 371 67.9 546 100.0
Total 228 29.0 557 71.0 785 100.0
Size n % n % n % Value p-Value
SME 20 30.3 46 69.7 66 100.0
0.061 0.970
Large 169 29.0 414 71.0 583 100.0
MNE 39 28.7 97 71.3 136 100.0
Total 228 29.0 557 71.0 785 100.0
Sector Supplement n % n % n % Value p-Value
Otherwise 51 29.5 122 70.5 173 100.0
0.020 0.886Financial services 177 28.9 435 71.1 612 100.0
Total 228 29.0 557 71.0 785 100.0
* p < 0.01.
Table 8. Analysis of factors of choice of assurance provider at the financial services sector.
B S.E. z Sig. Exp(B)
Constant 0.65447 0.87907 0.745 0.4566 1.924122462
Country (stakeholder) 2.97261 1.31316 2.264 0.0236 * 19.54285995
Country (otherwise) 21.9771 1199.76499 0.018 0.9854 3503751190
Listing status (listed) −6.07014 1.43427 −4.232 2.31 × 10−5 * 0.00231085
Size (large) −0.44856 0.91528 −0.490 0.6241 0.638546998
Size (MNE) 15.6606 584.53295 0.027 0.9786 6328665.814
Supplement (yes) 0.01864 0.20622 0.090 0.9280 1.018814809
Country (stakeholder) * Size (large) −2.15434 1.34994 −1.596 0.1105 0.115979712
Country (shareholder) * Size (large) −21.3671 1199.76504 −0.018 0.9858 5.25275 × 10−10
Country (stakeholder) * Size (MNE) −2.45603 1.37855 −1.782 0.0748 ** 0.085774802
Country (shareholder) * Size (MNE) −23.00108 1199.76526 −0.019 0.9847 1.02508 × 10−10
Listing status (listed) * Size (large) 6.04035 1.44858 4.170 3.05 × 10−5 * 420.0400232
Listing status (listed) * Size (MNE) −9.75041 584.53405 −0.017 0.9867 5.82708 × 10−5
Chisq = 81.037 p-value = 2.6159 × 10−12 * < 0.001
Nagelkerke R-square = 0.1400500
Hosmer and Lemeshow: Chi-square = 5.5972; p = 0.3474
Area under the curve (ROC): 0.6255
Overall percentage = 73.24841%
Specificity = 9.65%
Sensitivity = 99.28%
* p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05.
In order to assess the importance of the main factors, we performed univariate logistic regression
and we calculated the decrease in residual deviance from the null model (Table 9). As expected,
the main factor is country, followed by the listing status. The remaining variables produce very small
reduction in residual deviance.
Table 9. Residual deviance in univariate models (choice of assurance provider).
Model Residual Deviance Decrease in Residual Deviance
Model 1: A.P. = α (null model) 946
Model 2: A.P. = α + β1 country 933.16 12.84
Model 3: A.P. = α + β1 listing status 937.88 8.12
Model 4: A.P. = α + β1 size 945.94 0.06
Model 5: A.P. = α + β1 supplement 945.98 0.02
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In summary, regarding our fourth research question, we affirmed that the choice of accountants
as assurance providers was positively associated with stakeholder-oriented countries, and negatively
associated with listed firms. Use of the sector supplement and size was not associated with this
choice. Results showed that listed large companies were more prone to choose accountants as assurors,
compared to the listed SMEs. We also evidenced that, in stakeholder-oriented countries, MNEs are less
prone to choose accountants, compared to SMEs.
When we shift our attention to the assurance statements, we focus on relations between assurance
providers and assurance standards, assurance scope, and level of assurance.
With reference to assurance standards (Table 10), we found that 58.3% of assurance services were
performed according to ISAE 3000, AA1000AS, or a combination of both standards, while 41.7% did
not obey these standards. Findings indicate that ISAE 3000 was the most used standard (33.9%),
which agrees with Manetti and Becatti [76], Ferreira et al. [79], and Fonseca [11], but contradicts
Manetti and Toccafondi [77] and Perego and Kolk [78], who stated that most providers combined
standards. The employment of ISAE 3000 was more common among accountants (44.5%), which is
not surprising, given that these standards stems from an international auditing body [78]. In contrast,
the use of AA1000AS was more frequent among non-accountants (39%), which shows a greater interest
in stakeholders, as this standard is based on their inclusivity and responsiveness to their concerns,
and also on identifying material issues to them. On the other hand, the combination of both standards
is more likely among accountants (9.7%). The Pearson Chi-square test revealed that there was a
significant association between assurance providers and the use of assurance standards (p < 0.01).
Table 10. Assurance standards per assurance provider.
Standards Otherwise AA1000AS ISAE 3000 Combination Total Chi-Square
Provider n % n % n % n % n % Value p-Value
Non-accountant 109 47.8 89 39.0 18 7.9 12 5.3 228 100.0
176.511 0.000 *Accountant 218 39.1 37 6.6 248 44.5 54 9.7 557 100.0
Total 327 41.7 126 16.1 266 33.9 66 8.4 785 100.0
* p < 0.01.
With regards to the assurance scope (Table 11), results showed that most of the assurance
services (46.1%) covered entire sustainability reports. Among accountants, 44.3% of assurance services
focused on entire reports, 42.7% referred to specified sections, and 12.9% did not specify the scope.
Among non-accountants, 50.4% of assurance services focused on entire reports, 32% referred to
specified sections, and 17.5% did not define the scope. According to the Pearson Chi-square test,
the type of provider was significantly associated with the assurance scope (p < 0.05). Specifically,
assurance of specified sections was more usual among accountants, while assurance covering entire
sustainability reports was more common among non-accountants.
Table 11. Assurance scope per assurance provider.
Scope Unspecified Specified Sections Entire Report Total Chi-Square
Provider n % n % n % n % Value p-Value
Non-accountant 40 17.5 73 32.0 115 50.4 228 100.0
8.405 0.015 **Accountant 72 12.9 238 42.7 247 44.3 557 100.0
Total 112 14.3 311 39.6 362 46.1 785 100.0
** p < 0.05.
Regarding the level of assurance (Table 12), figures revealed that most assurance statements
(63.4%) refer to a limited/moderate level. This is in line with Manetti and Becatti [76] and Manetti and
Toccafondi [77], but in contrast to Fonseca [11]. Among accountants, 69.8% applied a limited/moderate
level, 11.1% a reasonable/high level, 3.4% combined two levels, and 15.6% did not specify the level.
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Among non-accountants, 47.8% applied a limited/moderate level, 12.7% a reasonable/high level,
2.6% combined the levels, and 36.8% did not define the level. As shown by the Pearson Chi-square
test, there was a significant association between assurance providers and the level of assurance
(p < 0.01). Specifically, the application of a limited/moderate level and the combination of levels was
more likely among accountants, while the application of a reasonable/high level was more expected
among non-accountants.
Table 12. Level of assurance per assurance provider.
Level Unspecified Limited/Moderate Reasonable/High Combination Total Chi-Square
Provider n % n % n % n % n % Value p-Value
Non-accountant 84 36.8 109 47.8 29 12.7 6 2.6 228 100.0
46.489 0.000 *Accountant 87 15.6 389 69.8 62 11.1 19 3.4 557 100.0
Total 171 21.8 498 63.4 91 11.6 25 3.2 785 100.0
* p < 0.01.
Hence, answering our fifth research question, we found differences in the assurance statements,
according to the type of assurance provider, which agrees with Deegan et al. [72,73]. Standards,
scope, and level of assurance are associated with the type of provider. With regard to assurance
standards, we support O’Dwyer and Owen [70], Mock et al. [74,75], and Perego and Kolk [78],
by affirming that non-accountants widely use the AA1000AS standard, while accountants use mostly
the ISAE 3000 perspective. Regarding the scope, the likelihood of assuring specified sections was
higher for accountants, while the probability of assuring the entire sustainability report is higher for
non-accountants. With regard to the level of assurance, we agree with O’Dwyer and Owen [70] and
Mock et al. [74,75] by confirming that the likelihood of applying a limited/moderate level, which is a
more conservative, cautious, and limited approach that provides low levels of assurance, is higher
for accountants, while the possibility of applying a reasonable/high level, that is, a more evaluative
approach that provides higher levels, is greater for non-accountants. According to Hasan et al. [71],
the application of a limited/moderate level instead of a reasonable/high level is due to the nature of
the case, the lack of appropriate criteria or standards, considerations of cost/benefit, the lack of proper
evidence, and the needs of users.
5. Conclusions
The financial services sector plays a key role of intermediation in society, valuing assets,
monitoring borrowers, managing risks, and organising payments, among other activities. Thus,
it strongly influences society because of its large ‘social footprint’.
However, the critical situation experienced by the sector during the last global crisis has caused
discredit in and distrust of society because of lack of transparency. Consequently, sustainability is
necessary to strengthen users’ confidence among the many stakeholders that are deeply interested in
its activities.
Despite its relevance and sensitiveness, the academic literature on sustainability reporting and
assurance traditionally has focused mainly on ‘environmentally-sensitive sectors’, maintaining a
research-gap regarding ‘socially-sensitive sectors’ that this work has wanted to address.
Although there are some works about sustainability reporting in ‘socially-sensitive sectors’,
to the best of our knowledge there has been no research about sustainability assurance in one of the
most critical of them: the financial services. In this sense, our study represents a novelty within the
worldwide analysis of sector-level differences in sustainability reporting and assurance.
This study analyses whether the adoption of assurance and the choice of assurance providers
are associated with sector-, country- and company-level factors. Moreover, we study differences in
assurance across providers. Because of the limitations of the different theoretical frameworks to cover
a complex phenomenon like sustainability reporting and assurance, we use the institutional theory
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to analyse the country-level factors, and legitimacy and stakeholder theories to study the company
level factors.
In relation to adoption of assurance, our first results show that there is a significant association
between financial Services and the adoption of assurance. The financial services sector is among the
sectors where adoption of assurance is more frequent, is over the general trend, and is more likely to
adopt assurance than companies from other sectors.
As a socially-sensitive sector, this is a mirror image of concern on the demands of transparency
and the need for credibility. In this regard, the decision to assure sustainability reports could be
explained both for the institutional, legitimacy, and stakeholder theories. From the institutional theory
perspective of mimetic isomorphism, companies could adopt assurance to resemble or mimic the
behaviour of competitors, especially the leaders in their sector, in response to sector pressures [49],
such as competition or sensitivity to external demands and high political costs [48]. On the other hand,
the adoption of assurance could be also explained by the legitimacy theory, since companies with
high environmental and/or social impacts are more visible to the public and, consequently, have a
greater need to demonstrate that they are socially responsible and legitimise their role in society [57].
Finally, the stakeholder theory could also explain the decision of adopting assurance, since companies
from different sectors act according to their stakeholders’ expectations [59], and therefore, stakeholder
pressure influences this decision [45,49].
Our findings also reveal that adoption of assurance depends on company size, the use of the
sector supplement, interaction between listed and multinational firms, and interaction between
‘otherwise’ countries and sector supplements. The importance of the effects of sector supplement, size,
and listing status shows that legitimacy theory plays a main role in explaining the decision of assuring
sustainability reports. In this respect, we add two precisions. First, size shows a negative association,
which is in contrary to the expected sign according to legitimacy theory. This fact could be explained
by the greater proximity between SMEs and their stakeholders, and according to stakeholder theory.
Second, although sector supplement has not been a variable that is employed by the literature, it is
understandable that its link with legitimacy theory, since firms that pursue legitimacy decide to use
the sector supplement and to assure the sustainability report. Both contribute to the credibility of their
commitment with sustainability.
With reference to the choice of assurance providers, our results reveal that it is associated with
the sector where companies operate. Specifically, financial services companies show a preference by
accountants. The choice of accountants could be justified because of the perception that this type of
providers offers a higher quality [75]. Perego [80], Zorio et al. [63], and Fernández-Feijoó-Souto et
al. [81] stated that the quality of assurance is higher when the provider is an accountant. Accordingly,
the legitimacy theory could explain this choice, since companies operating in more visible sectors
act to show their commitment with sustainability, and accountants seem to provide more quality.
The stakeholder theory could also explain this decision, since stakeholder pressure influences the
selection of assurance providers [45].
Our findings also evidence that the choice of assurance provider depends on the country where the
company is located, in the way that companies domiciled in stakeholder-oriented countries are more
likely to choose accountants than companies located in shareholder-oriented countries. In this respect,
institutional theory could explain this choice, since from the perspective of the coercive isomorphism,
it seems that the legal systems act as an influential factor. We also found that listing status influences
choice of provider, with non-listed companies being more likely to choose accountants than listed
companies (despite assurors accountants have higher perceived quality). However, we point out
that, within the group of listed companies, large companies prefer accounting firms. On the other
hand, we did not find that the size and the use of the sector supplement influenced the choice of
assurance provider.
Focusing on the assurance statements, findings show the differences across providers. Regarding
assurance standards, most of assurance services were performed according to ISAE 3000, AA1000AS
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or a combination of both standards. Specifically, ISAE 3000 is mainly employed by accountants,
while AA1000AS is mostly used by non-accountants. The adoption of these standards is consistent
with the institutional theory approach of normative isomorphism [42,54]. With reference to the scope,
we found that assurance on entire sustainability report is more common among non-accountants,
while assurance on specified sections is more frequent among accountants. For the level of assurance,
the application of a limited/moderate level and the combination of levels are more likely among
accountants, while the application of a reasonable/high level is more highly expected among
non-accountants. This is seen as accountants being more likely to apply a more conservative,
cautious, and limited approach to provide low levels of assurance, while non-accountants apply
a more evaluative approach and provided higher levels [70,74,75].
For limitations, it should be noted that results can only be generalised to companies that are
included in the GRI database and, therefore, we cannot extrapolate them to the whole financial
services sector.
Finally, we formulate as future research lines the analysis of other factors that could influence the
decision of adopting sustainability assurance and the choice of providers. Moreover, we propose to
examine assurance statements in depth, to assess their quality, and to determine what factors affect
this quality. It would be interesting to study sustainability assurance practices in other sectors to
compare whether companies are affected by the same factors in all sectors. This is especially interesting
among ‘sensitive sectors’. In addition, researchers could interview companies about their assurance
practices to know their motivations, benefits, and barriers to assure their sustainability reports. Finally,
we propose to study the opinion of stakeholders with regards to the assurance services.
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